The ADGM Court Confirms its Jurisdiction to Issue Anti-Suit Injunctions to Restrain Onshore Court Proceedings

Introduction

On 13 August 2025, the Abu Dhabi Global Market (ADGM) Court of First Instance (Court of First Instance), in its judgment in A22 and B22 v. C22 [2025] ADGMCFI 0018, confirmed that the ADGM Courts have jurisdiction to issue an anti-suit injunction restraining onshore Abu Dhabi court proceedings where it would be “just and convenient” to do so. However, on the facts, the Court of First Instance declined to grant the requested relief. 

Background

The underlying dispute arose out of a payout under an insurance policy that D22 (Contractor) took out with C22 (Insurer) (Policy). As required by the Policy, the Contractor engaged A22, a marine warranty surveyor (Surveyor), for services relating to the loadout and transportation of items for the project (Services). The engagement was made under a letter of intent, which contemplated that the parties would enter a formal service order (Service Order). The Service Order, which was only executed about a year after the Services had been performed, stated that it was subject to the Surveyor’s general terms and conditions, which provides for disputes to be resolved by arbitration under the arbitration rules of the International Chamber of Commerce, seated in Abu Dhabi (Arbitration Agreement).  

During the performance of the Services, some equipment was damaged, and the Contractor claimed for loss under the Policy. After indemnifying the Contractor, the Insurer commenced proceedings in the Abu Dhabi onshore courts against the Contractor, the Surveyor and another related entity, B22 (Co-Defendant), to recover the payout. The defendants raised a jurisdictional objection based on the Arbitration Agreement but nonetheless participated in the court proceedings. 

Partway through the onshore court proceedings, the Surveyor and Co-Defendant sought an anti-suit injunction from the ADGM Courts to prevent the Insurer from continuing the onshore court proceedings in light of the Arbitration Agreement contained in the Surveyor’s general terms and conditions, referred to in the contract between the Contractor and the Surveyor. The Contractor and the Surveyor took the position that the Insurer was bound by the Arbitration Agreement on the basis that the onshore court proceedings had been brought under asserted subrogation rights which became operative after the insurance moneys were paid to the Contractor. 

Judgment of the ADGM Court of First Instance

The Court of First Instance was required to consider whether it had jurisdiction to entertain the application for an interim anti-suit injunction and if jurisdiction were to exist, whether the Court of First Instance should exercise it in favour of the Surveyor and Co-Defendant. 

On the first issue, the Court of First Instance held that it had jurisdiction to issue an interim anti-suit injunction restraining onshore court proceedings by virtue of sections 16 and 41 of the ADGM Courts, Civil Evidence, Judgments, Enforcement and Judicial Appointments Regulations 2015 (the ADGM Courts Regulations). Section 16(2)(c) of the ADGM Courts Regulations states that the Court of First Instance may exercise any jurisdiction conferred upon it by the ADGM Courts Regulations and section 41 is the principal source of jurisdiction for an anti-suit injunction application (whether interim or final). In reaching this decision, the Court of First Instance noted that section 41 of the ADGM Court Regulations provides the same jurisdiction as section 37(1) and (2) of the United Kingdom (UK) Senior Courts Act 1981 and that the UK Supreme Court had confirmed the ability of the court to issue anti-suit injunctions under that section. 

Having found jurisdiction, the Court of First Instance then considered whether it would be “just and convenient”—the language used in section 41(1) of the ADGM Courts Regulations—to grant the requested relief. 

When considering the meaning of “just and convenient”, the Court of First Instance cited the principles adopted by Foxton J in QBE Europe SA/NV v Generali Espana de Seguros y Reaseguros [2022] EWHC 2062 (Comm), as follows:

1. The touchstone for making an order is what the ends of justice require; 
2. The jurisdiction should be exercised with caution; 
3. The applicant must establish with a “high degree of probability” that there is an arbitration agreement governing the dispute in question; and 
4. A defendant must show “strong reasons” why relief should not be granted, if such an agreement can be established to that standard.

Regarding the question of whether the Surveyor and Co-Defendant had established to “a high degree of probability” that there is a valid arbitration agreement governing the dispute in question, the Court of First Instance noted that this would necessarily require judicial evaluation of the likelihood of a valid arbitration agreement being established at the necessary time. The Court of First Instance stated that although Federal Law No. 6 of 2018—the procedural law governing arbitrations seated in Abu Dhabi—expressly permits the incorporation of an arbitration agreement by reference, further submissions would be required to determine whether the Arbitration Agreement in the Surveyor’s general terms and conditions had been validly incorporated. In any event, the Court of First Instance held that there were other reasons which rendered it unable to conclude that there is a “high degree of probability” of a valid arbitration agreement, such as the timing of execution of the Service Order (one year after the event that gave rise to the claim) and the fact that the Co-Defendant was not a party to the contract in which the arbitration agreement was alleged to reside. 

The Court of First Instance further held that, even if it was wrong on this issue, it would still have exercised its discretion not to grant an interim order. This was in part because the order was only sought after the panel of experts had issued an adverse report in the onshore court proceedings, and because the Court of First Instance felt it was not appropriate to interfere with the processes of the onshore court. The Court of First Instance stated that it was not unusual for the onshore courts to defer making a decision on jurisdiction until judgment on the merits is given, and therefore, it would not be appropriate to interfere with that process and any subsequent rights of appeal. 

Conclusion

This judgment is significant because it demonstrates that the ADGM Courts have jurisdiction over a claim for an anti-suit injunction restraining onshore court proceedings notwithstanding that the seat of the arbitration (assuming the arbitration agreement is found to be valid) is outside the ADGM (in this case, the seat of arbitration was Abu Dhabi). It also serves to emphasise the importance of parties acting promptly to seek to restrain court proceedings filed in violation of an arbitration agreement. In this regard, the Court of Appeal noted that, whilst delay is not necessarily a bar to relief, the court can refuse relief on the grounds of delay if the circumstances of the particular case so demand.

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