Supreme Court Expands Presidential Control Over Independent Agencies: Key Takeaways for Regulated Businesses

The US Supreme Court’s decision in Trump v. Slaughter (Slaughter) marks a major expansion of the president’s power to fire leaders of independent agencies—and a corresponding shift in political control over those agencies. The Court held that the statutory for-cause removal protection for the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) is unconstitutional because the FTC exercises executive power and must remain subject to presidential control. The Court drew an important limit the same day in Trump v. Cook (Cook), distinguishing the Federal Reserve (Fed) as a historically grounded exception to its opinion in Slaughter and concluding that its Governors may remain protected by for-cause removal limits. Taken together, the cases reflect a strong unitary-executive approach to separation of powers, tempered by a narrow historical exception for central-bank independence.

Presidential Control Becomes the Default and Independent Agencies Are Diminished

The Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor upheld for-cause removal protections for FTC Commissioners.¹ In Slaughter, the Court rejected that protection for modern agencies that exercise executive power. The Court concluded that the FTC’s rulemaking, investigative, adjudicatory, and enforcement authorities fall within the “heartland of executive power.”²  

The majority grounded that rule in Article II accountability and founding-era history, emphasizing that the US Constitution rejected a “committee-style Executive Branch” in favor of a unitary, accountable president. The Court focused on three FTC functions: substantive rulemaking with the force of law; investigations and in-house adjudications; and civil suits on behalf of the United States.³ Although not a formal test, the opinion offers a practical roadmap: courts will ask whether an agency binds private conduct through rules, enforces federal law against private parties through investigations or adjudications, or brings enforcement actions in court. The Court put the point bluntly: “when an agency ‘executes’ a congressional mandate against private parties, it exercises executive power—no ifs, ands, or quasis about it.”⁴ 

The Court left some room for entities performing investigative or informational functions for Congress, but that space appears narrow after the Court’s broad unitary-executive reasoning.⁵ Indeed, the dissent warned that the ruling would shift power over “dozens of independent commissions” to the president, identifying agencies such as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission, the Consumer Product Safety Commission, the Chemical Safety Board, and the Nuclear Regulatory Commission as potentially affected.⁶

Our earlier Quick Guide to Independent Regulatory Agencies maps agency structure, leadership, and removal protections for potentially affected agencies.⁷ 

The Federal Reserve Remains Different

Cook confirms that Slaughter has limits. The Court treated the Fed as a special historical arrangement rooted in central-bank independence and the First and Second Banks of the United States. It also concluded that Fed Governors may remain protected by a meaningful for-cause standard, that the president’s cause determination is judicially reviewable, and that a Governor is entitled to notice and some opportunity to respond before removal.⁸ 

Key Takeaways

Independent agencies are not gone, but many are now less independent 

For multimember agencies exercising classic regulatory and enforcement powers, for-cause removal protections are now highly vulnerable after Slaughter.

Agency priorities may shift faster with changing administrations 

Clients should expect more direct White House influence over agencies that previously operated with greater insulation from presidential removal, impacting regulatory certainty. Accordingly, clients with regulatory matters pending before impacted agencies will now need to factor in the political election cycle into their strategic planning.

The Federal Reserve is different 

Cook preserves the Fed’s for-cause protection because of its unique history and monetary-policy role, but the Court’s reasoning may invite future challenges over how far that historical exception extends and to which other agencies.⁹  

Future disputes will be about the margins 

Expect litigation over agencies that combine rulemaking, enforcement, and adjudication with claims to special historical, adjudicatory, or quasi-private status.

For regulated businesses, the practical consequence of Slaughter is significant. Agencies may retain the formal structural features of independence, but after Slaughter, the regulators that businesses engage with most often may operate with substantially greater accountability to—and direction from—the White House.

We acknowledge the contributions to this publication from our summer associate Andi Jordan.