Supreme Court to Redefine the President's Power to Fire Independent Agency Heads: Implications for Business

Since returning to office in January 2025, President Trump has made broad assertions of executive authority, including the power to fire independent agency heads at will.¹ For almost a century, these officials have been protected by law from such “without cause” removals, enjoying insulation from direct presidential control. That status quo—rooted in the Supreme Court’s 1935 decision in Humphrey’s Executor v. United States—is on the verge of transformation.

This term, the Supreme Court will reconsider Humphrey’s Executor and decide whether Congress may insulate independent agency heads from the president’s control. The practical implications are significant, including increased presidential oversight of regulatory decisions made across independent agencies such as the Federal Reserve System, the Securities and Exchange Commission, the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB), and many others. Depending on how the Supreme Court rules in the pending cases, businesses may have to reassess how they interact with these agencies in the regulatory process. 

Humphrey’s Executor and Removal Authority

Although the president has clear constitutional authority to remove executive agency heads (such as the Secretary of State), Congress has long sought to restrict the removal power as it relates to leaders of “independent” boards and commissions—those agencies that Congress has structured to be more insulated from presidential control. To that end, Congress has often imposed “for cause” restrictions on the president’s ability to remove the heads of these independent agencies.² The Supreme Court validated this approach in Humphrey’s Executor, where it upheld a law that prevented the president from removing FTC members except in cases of “inefficiency, neglect of duty, or malfeasance in office.”³ That decision—which was seen as a check on President Roosevelt—established that Congress could limit the president’s removal authority for independent agencies, which function as quasi-legislative or quasi-judicial bodies.⁴

Nearly a century later in Seila Law LLC v. CFPB, the Supreme Court refused to extend Humphrey’s Executor to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB), noting that the CFPB’s single director held significant “executive” power, unlike the “New Deal-era” FTC’s “multimember” expert panel.⁵ The Court also suggested that it might rule differently on Humphrey’s Executor today.⁶ That shift aligns with the Supreme Court’s growing support for the unitary executive theory—a theory that has been advanced by multiple presidents for many years—under which the president has direct and sole control over the entire executive branch based on Article 2 of the Constitution, which states that “[t]he executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America.” 

Legal Challenges to President Trump’s Exercise of Removal Authority

In recent months, President Trump has fired several independent agency heads, directly challenging Congress’s limits on his removal power. The president signaled his position early in his term, when the Justice Department told Congress that it would no longer defend “for-cause” removal rules and would urge the Supreme Court to overrule Humphrey’s Executor. ⁷

These firings have affected more than a dozen independent agencies, sparking a wave of litigation. Bound by Humphrey’s Executor, lower courts have rejected the firings for violating Congress’s for-cause removal provisions. But given the Supreme Court’s treatment of emergency requests in these cases, many expect the Court to ultimately agree with the president and find that statutory for-cause removal restrictions are unconstitutional.

One key case is a Humphrey’s Executor déjà vu, involving President Trump’s firing of FTC Commissioner Rebecca Slaughter—the same position at issue in the landmark decision. President Trump dismissed Slaughter via an email, citing her service as “inconsistent” with the administration’s priorities.⁸ Slaughter filed suit, and the district court ordered her reinstatement. The government appealed to the D.C. Circuit, requesting a stay of her reinstatement, but the request was denied.⁹ The government then asked the Supreme Court for an emergency stay, which the Court granted in a 6-3 ideological split (thus preventing Slaughter’s reinstatement while the case is litigated). The majority provided no explanation, prompting a dissent by Justice Kagan, joined by Justices Sotomayor and Jackson, who warned against using the Court’s emergency docket to “reshape the Nation’s separation of powers” by shifting authority from Congress to the president. 

The Supreme Court also took the unusual step of granting certiorari before judgment, allowing the Court to directly review the district court’s decision.¹⁰ The Court will hear Slaughter’s case in December 2025, and has directed both sides to address whether Humphrey’s Executor should be overruled. Meanwhile, the Court has blocked the reinstatement of several other officials who are similarly contesting their at-will terminations, including from the Consumer Product Safety Commission (CPSC), Merit Systems Protection Board, and the NLRB.¹¹

The Supreme Court took a slightly different tack for the president’s for-cause removal of Lisa Cook from the Federal Reserve Board, declining to immediately grant the government’s request to remove her during litigation. Instead, Cook remains in office, with arguments on the government’s stay request scheduled for January 2026.¹² The difference in approach could suggest that the Court’s reconsideration of Humphrey’s Executor will impact independent agencies differently, depending on each agency’s composition and functions. Even if some for-cause protections are deemed constitutional, thorny questions will remain about the scope of review and deference granted to the president in making requisite findings for removal.

What Lies Ahead for Independent Agencies and Those They Regulate

Stakeholders in government and industry are closely watching, with many expecting the Supreme Court to use the Slaughter and Cook cases to redefine the president’s authority over independent agencies. As shown in the Quick Guide to Independent Regulatory Agencies, there are dozens of independent agencies that currently enjoy for-cause and other congressional protections. The future of these protections (and potentially the very structure of these agencies) is uncertain. If Humphrey’s Executor is overturned, these agencies may be brought under direct presidential control. Treating more of these independent agencies like traditional executive agencies could lead to: (1) rapid policy swings, as regulatory priorities shift with each new administration; (2) enforcement volatility tied to current political trends; and (3) greater external influence on agency decision-making. But with such shifts may also come increased accountability to voters and the political process.

Many businesses are directly regulated by independent agencies such as the CPSC, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the FTC, the NLRB, the Surface Transportation Board, and several others.¹³ The manner in which these agencies regulate industry could dramatically change, depending on whether the Supreme Court overrules Humphrey’s Executor and which agencies are affected by the Court’s new approach to the president’s removal authority. As a result, businesses may have opportunities to advocate more directly for their regulatory prerogatives.