US Department of Justice Antitrust Division Introduces Whistleblower Reward Program to Encourage Disclosure of Antitrust Violations

On 8 July 2025, the US Department of Justice Antitrust Division (the Division) unveiled a new Whistleblower Rewards Program (the Whistleblower Program) that provides a significant monetary incentive—up to 30% of the recovered criminal fine—to individuals who voluntarily provide the Division with original information about criminal antitrust violations. A first-of-its-kind in US antitrust enforcement (although numerous foreign jurisdictions have similar programs in place), the Whistleblower Program seeks “to create a new pipeline of leads,” according to Division Assistant Attorney General Abigail Slater, and could accelerate the race to leniency for companies under the Division’s long-standing Corporate Leniency Policy. 

While time will tell the full scope and impact of the Whistleblower Program, including how certain provisions and potentially impactful limitations will be applied, the rollout of the Whistleblower Program itself should serve as another reminder to companies of the importance of antitrust compliance and a good reason to refresh internal reporting policies and procedures. Below, we take a closer look at the Whistleblower Program, including its authority, formation, and operation; explain who may and may not be eligible for an award and how the award amount is determined; provide some predictions on its impact on the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy; and provide practical takeaways for companies and their leadership teams to mitigate risk. 

Whistleblower Program: Authority, Formation, and Operation

The Whistleblower Program was established through a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) between the Division, the US Postal Service (Postal Service), and the Postal Service’s Office of Inspector General (USPS OIG). The MOU outlines a cooperative framework to incentivize individuals to report original and credible information regarding criminal antitrust violations that affect the Postal Service. 

The authority and formation of the Whistleblower Program, according to the MOU, is rooted in 39 U.S.C. § 2601 and 39 U.S.C. § 404(a)(7), which empowers the Postal Service to collect fines, penalties, and forfeitures resulting from violations of law impacting the Postal Service and to pay up to one-half of those sums to the individual who reports the violation. The MOU builds on this statutory foundation to authorize and operationalize a formal whistleblower rewards mechanism.

The program will be implemented by the Division, in coordination with the Postal Service and USPS OIG. The Division will be responsible for evaluating incoming whistleblower reports to determine if they contain original, specific, and credible information. Reports may be submitted directly to the Division through its website or through the USPS OIG or the US Postal Inspection Service (USPIS), which then evaluates and, if appropriate, forwards the report to the Division. If the Division finds the reported information qualifies, it is sent to a designated USPIS official for confirmation that the alleged misconduct falls within the Postal Service’s legal purview. If confirmed, the Division will designate the report as potentially eligible for a whistleblower reward, pending the outcome of the investigation.

If a whistleblower’s report results in a criminal conviction and fine of at least US$1 million, the Division will approve collection of a portion of the criminal fine by the Postal Service, which will then retain half of what it collected and pay the whistleblower the other half. The award amount is determined in the sole discretion of the Division, in consultation with USPIS and USPS OIG, as described in more detail below. 

Whistleblower Eligibility

Whistleblower eligibility is limited to those who voluntarily provide original information of an eligible criminal violation. Potential whistleblowers are ineligible if they coerced others to participate in or were “clearly the leader or originator” of the illegal activity. Current law enforcement employees and their relatives are also ineligible. 

• Voluntarily: A whistleblower must provide information before any formal demand from the Division, the Postal Service, or any other federal law enforcer, including before an employer’s application to the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy. 
• Original Information: There are several requirements for what can constitute “original” information, including that it cannot be derived solely from public sources, cannot have already been known to the Division or USPS, cannot have been obtained through an attorney-client privileged communication, and cannot (absent certain circumstances) have been obtained through the provision of legal, accounting, or audit functions. A whistleblower who first reports information internally to his or her employer may be eligible if both the company and individual later report the information to the Division.
• Eligible Criminal Violation: The Whistleblower Program covers criminal violations of the Sherman Antitrust Act (e.g., price fixing, bid rigging, market allocation, monopolization), as well as other federal crimes that (a) “effectuate, facilitate, or conceal” violations of the Sherman Act; (b) target public procurement; or (c) impede a federal competition investigation.

Finally, given its statutory foundation, the MOU requires that the information provided must allow a USPIS official to conclude that the Postal Service suffered an “identifiable” harm, though such harm need not be material or pose a substantial detriment to the Postal Service. 

The Award Amount Has the Potential to Be Substantial

Eligible whistleblowers are presumptively paid a minimum 15% of the recovered criminal fine but can be paid up to a maximum 30%. If multiple whistleblowers are eligible for an award, they share a single award subject to the same presumptive minimum and maximum.

In light of criminal fines and penalties recently collected by the Division, awards under the Whistleblower Program could be substantial. Take, for instance, the fines assessed in October 2024 as part of the Division’s prosecution of collusion among concrete sellers in Georgia. The colluding companies paid a total of US$22.7 million in criminal fines and penalties. If those prosecutions affected the Postal Service and had been precipitated by information supplied from a whistleblower, that whistleblower could have been paid between US$3.4 million and US$8.8 million. On the higher end, consider the US$225 million criminal penalty a generic drug manufacturer agreed to pay as part of a deferred prosecution agreement entered into with the Division in August 2023. The USPS OIG helped investigate the case. A whistleblower who provided information precipitating that agreement could have been paid between US$33 million and US$67.5 million. 

The program objectively offers a big monetary incentive, but just how often and how much whistleblowers will actually be paid remains to be seen. In 2015, the Division collected a staggering US$3.6 billion in criminal fines and penalties. But that number has shrunk considerably over the ensuing 10 years—down to US$529 million in 2020 and to US$10.6 million in 2024. Nonetheless, even if overall collections are down, the examples highlighted above demonstrate that the Whistleblower Program could still make big payouts—and represent a big incentive to report—to individuals in the right circumstances.

The Division Determines the Award Amount

Under the MOU, the Division determines the amount of any whistleblower award (and, if there are multiple whistleblowers, how to allocate the award) in its sole discretion but enumerates criteria it will consider. 

Four of the criteria relate to the nature of the information provided by the whistleblower, considering whether that information: (a) was directly related to a successful criminal prosecution, (b) was reliable and complete, (c) resulted in the conservation of government resources, and (d) supported one or more criminal convictions. The remaining six criteria relate to the whistleblower’s conduct, asking whether they: (a) provided ongoing, extensive, and timely cooperation and assistance; (b) assisted law enforcement in the recovery of the fruits and instrumentalities of the reported crime; (c) faced any unique hardships as a result of their reporting and assisting the criminal investigation and prosecution; (d) in their dealings with government authorities, interfered or obstructed the investigation; (e) participated in the criminal violation reported; or (f) received any award from any other government agency for reporting related conduct or recovered in any related civil suit. 

No private right of action was created related to the Whistleblower Program. This means, for instance, that no party can sue the government for an alleged failure to provide a whistleblower reward or otherwise challenge the way in which the Division implements or interprets the Whistleblower Program.

Interaction With the Division’s Corporate Leniency Policy

Since the early 1990s, the Division has lauded the success of its Corporate Leniency Policy in generating leads to uncover criminal antitrust violations. The Corporate Leniency Policy offers nonprosecution protections to the corporate entity (and its cooperating personnel) that is first to self-report and cooperate in a criminal antitrust investigation. Historically, the Corporate Leniency Policy led to numerous domestic and international criminal antitrust investigations and resulting corporate and individual convictions, generating billions of dollars in criminal fines. There have been indications of a decrease in leniency applicants in recent years, however. While only time and application will show the full breadth of potential interactions between the new Whistleblower Program and the Division’s long-standing Corporate Leniency Policy, the former has the potential to make the latter more potent. 

First, the Whistleblower Program may increase the risk of detection, which may make leniency more appealing. The Whistleblower Program’s monetary incentive for reporting suspected illegal activity will likely increase that risk by generating more individual reports across the board. And, more specifically, the Whistleblower Program may encourage more corporate employees to go around internal reporting structures and straight to the Division with such information in pursuit of a potentially large monetary award. When individuals or corporations are considering whether to apply for leniency, they must weigh the risk of detection and potential for prosecution against the costs associated with cooperation necessary under the Corporate Leniency Policy. As the risk of detection increases, cooperation burdens may seem more palatable and thus leniency as a whole more appealing.

Second, the Whistleblower Program may increase the importance of speedy applications for leniency by introducing a new competitor in the race to report. Individuals and corporations considering whether to apply for leniency now have to consider not only whether their conduct could be reported by others seeking leniency, but also whether it could be reported by individuals chasing a sizeable monetary award under the Whistleblower Program. Whether the Division already has information about illegal activity is a key criterion in determining the level of protection available under the Corporate Leniency Policy. Individuals cannot be granted leniency if the Division has “received information about the illegal activity from any other source,” including the Whistleblower Program. In those circumstances, corporations can only receive lesser “Type B” corporate leniency, where the Division will only “consider” protection from prosecution for corporate directors, officers, and employees. In the preferable “Type A” corporate leniency—where the Division has not already received information about the illegal activity—the Division guarantees a corporation’s “current directors, officers, and employees will not be charged criminally.” 

Practical Guidance

Companies and their leadership and legal teams are well-advised to take note of the Whistleblower Program and the impact it is likely to have on early detection of antitrust violations and resulting antitrust investigations conducted by the Division, raising the already high risk that antitrust violations can pose to companies. To mitigate these risks, consider the following:

• Compliance, compliance, compliance. An ounce of prevention is worth a pound of cure. Invest in an antitrust compliance program and continue to invest in it. The Division recently updated its guidance on corporate antitrust compliance programs, which can serve as a helpful resource when creating or evaluating your internal program, as can consulting knowledgeable antitrust counsel.
• Review your internal whistleblower policy. Ensure it offers adequate protections and incentives that will encourage employees to report concerns internally.
• Confirm clear and effective internal reporting protocols—and make sure they are being followed. Ensure all reports of potential misconduct are making their way to the legal team. 
• Investigate all reports of potential anticompetitive misconduct—and do so thoroughly and swiftly. The Whistleblower Program is likely to accelerate the race for leniency, making it even more important for the legal team to quickly understand what happened and properly evaluate and decide the company’s next steps. Involving knowledgeable antitrust counsel is often imperative to this process. 

The firm's Antitrust, Competition, and Trade Regulation practice group members regularly counsel clients on a broad range of antitrust and competition issues, including criminal antitrust violations. Our lawyers defend individuals and companies in a wide variety of criminal cases in the United States and also provide corporate counseling and training on how to remain compliant with US antitrust laws. The firm's postal law lawyers represent mailing, shipping, and e-commerce clients; mail service providers; mail technology companies; and industry trade associations on a wide-range of postal matters, including: strategic business counseling, contractual, and compliance advice; defending and resolving investigations and enforcement actions by the USPIS; and litigation before the Postal Regulatory Commission and federal courts.